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WHAT DID BROWN DO?
A LEGAL AND PERSONAL
JOURNEY
by JONATHAN BAUM
Brown v. Board of Education was more than just a legal ruling; it was asocial watershed. Brown struck down state laws that had mandated racial
segregation in schools because such separate educational facilities were inher-
ently unequal.1 The legacy of Brown is inspiring but complicated. More than
fifty years later, each of us is left asking: “What Did Brown Do?” As a student
and practitioner of civil rights law and as the product, and then a steward, of a
racially integrated school system, I bring to this question two different
perspectives.
I have practiced civil rights law for more than twenty-five years and most re-
cently co-authored an amicus brief, on the losing side, in Parents Involved in
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Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1. As I will discuss, the United
States Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Parents Involved represents the ulti-
mate retreat from the promise of Brown. We have gone from “you must deseg-
regate your schools” in 1954, to “you need not desegregate your schools if the
segregation is only ‘de facto’” in the 1970s, to “you are forbidden to desegregate
your schools if the segregation is de facto” in 2007.2
My personal journey through this period began with my enrollment, in 1966,
as an elementary school student in the Evanston public schools precisely be-
cause that school system was committed to racial integration. More recently,
my journey has continued as a member of the Board of Education for that
same school district, from 2003 to 2007, struggling to preserve a commitment
to racial integration from assaults both legal and political.
An examination of what Brown “did” really must begin with the question;
what was it supposed to do? There are sharply divergent views on this, even on
the United States Supreme Court. As reflected in the Parents Involved opinions,
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas believe that Brown
was supposed to end the assignment of children to schools on the basis of their
race, no more and no less.3 Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens
believe, on the other hand, that Brown sought racially integrated schools, be-
cause, in the words of Justice Thurgood Marshall, “unless our children begin
to learn together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to live
together.”4 Finally, still others believe that the objective of Brown was even
more ambitious: to improve the quality of education afforded to all children,
especially those of minority races.
In the first decade after Brown was handed down, none of these three objec-
tives were achieved in any substantial measure. There was the occasional,
highly publicized integration of a previously segregated school system, Little
Rock, Ark., being perhaps the most famous, but the vast majority of minority
children remained locked in racially isolated schools.5 This began to change in
1964, with the passage of the Civil Rights Act.6 This law gave willing national
administrations the “stick” of withholding federal aid to force desegregation
plans on recalcitrant school systems.7 This change in the law, coupled with a
growing popular commitment to racial integration, produced tremendous re-
ductions in school segregation in that first decade.8 Many more children were
attending school with children of races different from their own.9 In addition
to those communities forced to desegregate their schools, many communities
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around the nation, inspired by the promise of Brown, began to voluntarily
racially integrate their schools.10 One such community was Evanston, Ill.
My family moved to Evanston when I was in fourth grade. My parents specifi-
cally chose Evanston because they wanted my siblings and I to attend inte-
grated schools. In 1967, the Evanston public schools, which never engaged in
segregation by law, nevertheless undertook a voluntary desegregation plan.11
Evanston was, and still is, like most American communities, racially segregated
in its housing patterns. The “attendance areas” for most of the district’s schools
were virtually all white, while a few were virtually all black. The school author-
ities of Evanston understood that if they simply honored this “natural” separa-
tion of the races, they would be acquiescing in racially segregated schools in
perpetuity. The school authorities therefore began a long-term effort to achieve
what is disparagingly referred to by critics of integration efforts as “racial bal-
ance.” They began by closing the main “black” school and reassigning its stu-
dents to previously “white” schools. In subsequent years, they adopted a “60
Percent Guideline,” a goal (not a rigid quota) that no school’s population be
more than 60 percent of any one race.12 They employed specific measures to
achieve that goal, most notably: (1) periodic redrawing of the attendance areas
of the various schools, (2) the granting (or withholding) of permissive transfers
to schools in attendance areas other than that in which the applicant child
resided, and (3) establishment of magnet schools.13 Admission to the magnet
schools was not merit-based but by lottery, but the lottery results were
“tweaked” depending on whether the particular applicant would help or hin-
der both the sending and receiving school in complying with the 60 percent
guideline.14
I attended these racially integrated schools, as my children do now. I can only
answer the specific question, “What did Brown do for you?” by quoting from
Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion in Parents Involved: “While the focus of our
opinions is often on the benefits that minority schoolchildren receive from
integrated education,” he wrote, “children of all races benefit from integrated
classrooms and playgrounds.”15 I am certain that I am a better person, a better
parent, a better neighbor, a better boss and a better citizen by virtue of having
been educated in racially integrated schools.
In the meantime, as Evanston was voluntarily desegregating, a backlash set in
against school desegregation nationally. Fueling this backlash was the fact that
the effort to desegregate schools had moved out of the narrow confines of the
223
3
Baum: What did <i> Brown </i> Do? A Legal and Personal Journey
Published by LAW eCommons, 2009
26884_lpr_14-3 Sheet No. 6 Side B      08/07/2009   10:09:20
26884_lpr_14-3 Sheet No. 6 Side B      08/07/2009   10:09:20
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\L\LPR\14-3\LPR302.txt unknown Seq: 4 16-JUN-09 11:50
Loyola Public Interest Law Reporter
“peculiar” south to the large urban school systems in the rest of the nation.
Prominent national politicians rode this anti-integration wave, segregated
school systems were no longer threatened with the loss of federal funds, and
the United States Supreme Court itself retrenched. In a series of decisions cul-
minating in Milliken v. Bradley, a new Supreme Court majority vigorously
embraced the distinction between “de jure” segregation, children of different
races going to different schools because of an explicit legal requirement, and
“de facto” segregation, children of different races going to different schools as a
result of “natural forces” such as housing patterns.16 De jure segregation had to
be rectified; de facto segregation did not.17 So, in Milliken, a federal court
could not impose a desegregation plan involving reassignment of children in
the Detroit school district (virtually all black) together with children from the
surrounding suburban school districts (virtually all white), because the subur-
ban districts had not previously segregated black children, there were none, by
law.18 That this made it impossible to racially integrate the Detroit schools was
a consequence the Court’s majority was willing to accept.
Milliken was the beginning of the end for efforts to achieve racial integration
of the schools through judicial remedies. Court rulings like Milliken and a
retreat in American public opinion from the ideal of racial integration com-
bined to not only stall, but actually roll back, the promise of Brown. Since the
mid-1970s, nationwide the percentage of minority children attending racially
segregated schools has consistently increased and continues to do so.19
Still, there was Evanston and numerous other communities like it around the
nation. These were communities, some with a prior history of de jure segrega-
tion, some without, with a local commitment to racially integrated schools,
regardless of the retreat from the promise of Brown by the Court and the
national public.
In 2003, I was elected to the Board of Education of the Evanston school dis-
trict I had attended and to which I now send my children. I ran for the Board
principally because I saw the district’s commitment to racial integration under
attack, not from court decisions but from local political forces. A group of
older African-American activists had begun a campaign to eliminate the 60
percent guideline and re-establish a “neighborhood” school in Evanston’s vir-
tually all-black Fifth Ward. These activists, almost none of whom actually had
children in the schools, waxed nostalgic about the “sense of community” in the
segregated school that had been closed in order to bring about racial integra-
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tion. Most important, to focus on the precise topic of this program, these
activists had concluded that Brown, or racial integration, had not “done any-
thing” for their community. While having white children sit beside black chil-
dren in Evanston classrooms might please the sensibilities of Evanston’s largely
liberal white population, they complained, racial integration had failed to elim-
inate the huge “achievement gap,” as reflected on standardized tests, between
children from Evanston’s predominantly low-income black families and its al-
most-exclusively college-educated white ones. Overlooked, however, was the
fact that African-American students in Evanston performed significantly better
on standardized tests, had a higher graduation rate, and were more likely to go
to college than African-American students in Illinois or the nation as a
whole.20
To illustrate how law and local politics can overlap, the Evanston activists’
critique of racial integration in the schools was echoed by United States Su-
preme Court Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Thomas wrote in his Parents
Involved opinion that, “nothing but an interest in classroom aesthetics and a
hypersensitivity to elite sensibilities justifies the school districts’ racial balanc-
ing programs.”21 Studies of the impact of racial integration on African-Ameri-
can student achievement, Justice Thomas noted, correctly, were divided on its
value.22 “Given this tenuous relationship between forced racial mixing and im-
proved educational results for black children,” Justice Thomas concluded, it
cannot be “plausibly maintained” that “an educational element supports the
integration interest, let alone makes it compelling.”23 Indeed, the push for
racial integration was, in the view of Justice Thomas and the Evanston activ-
ists, not merely unnecessary but insulting. Justice Thomas wrote, “[t]here is no
reason to think that black students cannot learn as well when surrounded by
members of their own race as when they are in an integrated environment.”24
What of the social benefits of racial integration and the interest in producing
an educational environment that reflects the pluralistic society in which our
children will live? Justice Breyer denominates this as the “democratic element”
supporting desegregation.25 Justice Thomas perfunctorily dismisses this: “Stu-
dents of different races within the same school may separate themselves so-
cially” anyway, and besides, “[s]ome studies have found that a deterioration in
racial attitudes seems to result from racial mixing in schools.”26
Once on the Evanston Board of Education, I succeeded in pushing through a
reaffirmation, albeit a tepid one, of the 60 percent guideline. The idea of a new
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Fifth Ward school was shelved because there was no money to build one and
the existing schools had excess capacity anyway. However, the notion that
there was a conflict between racial integration and African-American student
achievement would not go away. In my third year on the Board, the same
group of activists began lobbying for the establishment of classrooms with an
“African-Centered Curriculum,” (ACC), at existing Evanston schools.27 It was
only by black students learning together, immersed exclusively in the culture
that was uniquely theirs, the activists argued, that they could achieve their full
academic potential.28
Invoking the school district’s mission statement, which committed the district
to “integrated education” and a “multicultural” curriculum, I opposed the
ACC program.29 I enlisted the support of nationally-renowned educator
Jonathan Kozol, author of Savage Inequalities and other books on race and
education.30 Mr. Kozol wrote a public appeal to my fellow Board members
praising Evanston as “a rare and distinguished exception to the present very
dangerous pattern of resurgent racial segregation in the nation’s public
schools.”31 He urged the Board members to “resist this betrayal of Brown v.
Board of Education.”32 He wrote, “I would be heartsick to have to report to my
friends among the education leaders of this country that Evanston has chosen
to give up the ethical distinction for which it is renowned.”33 Mr. Kozol con-
cluded bluntly, “I beg you not to do this.”34
The debate in the community grew quite heated. Some African-American par-
ents contacted me privately to express their opposition to ACC but declined to
go public with their views for fear of “breaking ranks.” To my shock and dis-
may, I was loudly and repeatedly denounced as a “racist” which is, of course,
the sharpest sword you can brandish against a white person in a liberal com-
munity like Evanston. My fellow white Board members expressed their fears
about being similarly labeled, and the Board approved the ACC on a five-to-
two vote.
Coincidentally, at the same time as I was fighting the racial integration battle
locally, I was also fighting it as a civil rights lawyer nationally. I joined a group
of attorneys in my firm who prepared an amicus brief for the Anti Defamation
League (ADL) in the Parents Involved case.35 The issue presented in Parents
Involved was whether the Seattle, Wash., and Louisville, Ky., school districts
were barred by the Equal Protection Clause from using race as a factor in
magnet school admissions in order to maintain racially integrated schools in
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the face of racially segregated housing patterns.36 The position of the ADL in
this litigation, supporting the two school districts, was noteworthy because
ADL has been most prominent for its strong and persistent opposition to the
use of racial quotas.37 But ADL recognized the difference between the use of
race to bring our children together and the use of race to keep them apart.38
ADL came to appreciate the “compelling interest” in children of different races
learning together in part from its experience operating the “A World of Differ-
ence Program,” in which thousands of teachers and peer trainers have brought
literally millions of children of all races together in workshops teaching the
values of tolerance and diversity.39
While the ADL may have come to appreciate the difference between employ-
ing race to include and employing race to exclude, such an awareness was
noticeably lacking in the highest court in the land. Foreshadowing the ultimate
result in Parents Involved, Chief Justice Roberts engaged, at oral argument, in a
remarkable exchange with the attorney for the Seattle school district. When the
attorney made the point that students denied admission to a magnet school in
order to maintain racial integration were not thereby deprived of a quality
education because they could still go to one of the district’s other schools, the
Chief Justice asked: “How is that different from the separate but equal argu-
ment? In other words, it doesn’t matter that they’re being assigned on the basis
of their race because they’re getting the same type of education.”40 It was dif-
ferent, the Seattle attorney responded, “because the schools are not racially
separate. The goal is to maintain the diversity that existed within a broad range
in order to try to obtain the benefits that the educational research shows flow
from an integrated education.”41 However, the Chief Justice persisted: “I
mean, everyone got a seat in Brown as well; but because they were assigned to
those seats on the basis of race, it violated equal protection. How is your argu-
ment that there’s no problem here because everybody gets a seat distinguisha-
ble?”42 Obviously exasperated with the moral obtuseness of the Chief Justice,
the Seattle attorney responded bluntly: “Because segregation is harmful. Inte-
gration, as this Court has recognized in Swann, in the first Seattle case, has
benefits.”43 It is a sad day when the Chief Justice of the United States has to be
reminded that integration is good and segregation is bad.
On May 15, 2007, I ended my term on the Evanston Board of Education,
with the future of racial integration in its schools, as a local political matter,
very much up in the air. Then, on June 28, 2007, the United States Supreme
Court gave vital aid and comfort to those who want to retreat from the prom-
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ise of Brown.44 In its decision in Parents Involved, the Court held, by a five-to-
four vote, that the Seattle and Louisville school districts had, indeed, violated
the Equal Protection Clause by using race as a factor in school assignment in
order to maintain racially integrated schools.45 The Court held that these lo-
cally-adopted voluntary integration plans were subject to “strict scrutiny,”
which meant that, in order to survive, they had to be “narrowly tailored” to
serve a “compelling state interest.”46 Four justices held that maintaining ra-
cially diverse schools simply was not “compelling,” so no race-conscious mea-
sures could be employed in service of that goal, end of case.47
Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, said that “a compelling interest exists in
avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school district, in its discretion and
expertise, may choose to pursue. Likewise, a district may consider it a compel-
ling interest to achieve a diverse student population.”48 Unwilling to go as far
as his four brethren, Justice Kennedy admonished that “to the extent that the
plurality opinion suggests that state and local authorities must accept the status
quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken.”49
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy provided the crucial fifth vote to invalidate the
Seattle and Louisville plans, because he concluded that they were not suffi-
ciently “narrowly tailored” to serve even a compelling interest in racially di-
verse schools.50 Specifically, he said that school districts may not advance their
interest in racially integrated schools by assigning specific students to specific
schools (or barring them from others) because of their race.51 This leaves open,
in Justice Kennedy’s view, numerous other ways school districts can “pursue
the goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and races.”52
Justice Kennedy even provides a list of such “constitutionally permissible” al-
ternatives: “strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones
with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating re-
sources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fash-
ion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race.”53
Pretty weak medicine for curing entrenched racial segregation.
What does this mean for Evanston? Within weeks after the Parents Involved
decision, the school district was threatened with a lawsuit challenging its use of
race as a factor in magnet school admissions. With the commitment to racial
integration so diminished already, the school board had little difficulty in
quickly ending this “offensive” use of race. There was discussion of perhaps
substituting the more constitutionally acceptable factor of “socioeconomic sta-
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tus” for race, but this was deemed too troublesome a can of worms to open.
Will race continue to be a factor in drawing Evanston attendance zones, a tool
Justice Kennedy left the district with? This is doubtful, as schools in Evanston
have been drifting outside the 60 percent guideline for years, some dramati-
cally so, and there doesn’t appear to be any interest in redistricting to address
this.
So, the bottom line more than fifty years after Brown is that it has been hol-
lowed. Both courts and public officials continue to give lip service to “the
value of diversity,” but the fact is that the United States Supreme Court has
systematically reduced the number of weapons in the arsenal of a school dis-
trict that wants to maintain racially integrated schools, and even in communi-
ties like Evanston, there is a diminished political will to use the few that
remain. Perhaps the most honest answer, then, to the question, “What Did
Brown Do For You?” is that whatever it was going to do, it has done.
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